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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, political new beginnings have increasingly been 
linked to questions of transitional justice. Africa is no exception. Since the 
establishment of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda during the mid-1990s, the African 
continent has loomed large in academic and political debates about how to deal with 
past injustices and realize political transition. The contributions to this collection 
examine a series of cases where peaceful ‘new beginnings’ have been declared after 
periods of violence and where transitional justice institutions played a role in 
defining justice and the new socio-political order. Three issues seem to be crucial to 
the understanding of transitional justice in the context of wider social debates on 
justice and political change: the problem of ‘new beginnings’, of finding a 
foundation for that which explicitly breaks with the past; the discrepancies between 
lofty promises and the messy realities of transitional justice in action; and the 
dialectic between logics of the exception and the ordinary, employed to legitimize 
or resist transitional justice mechanisms. These are the particular focus of this 
Introduction. 
 
 
 
This Special Issue Transition and justice: Negotiating the Terms of New Beginnings 
in Africa developed out of a panel with the same title at the AEGIS 4th European 
Conference on African Studies (ECAS 4) in Uppsala, Sweden, in 2011. We are 
greatly indebted to all participants and contributors as well as the editorial board 
and the anonymous reviewers of Development and Change for their insightful and 
constructive comments. We also would like to express our gratitude to Paula 
Bownas, the Managing Editor, who did a fantastic job and was very supportive 
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throughout.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In spite of the dramatic growth of transitional justice there are other sites in 
countries and regions affected by violence and armed conflicts where ideas about 
justice, reconciliation, retribution and political participation are being instantiated 
and contested. Among the sites explored in this special issue are re-education camps 
for demobilized combatants, refugee camps and prisons, as well as domestic courts, 
parliaments and village meetings. In these sites, former combatants and their leaders, 
politicians, civil society activists, village elders and ordinary people advance their 
views on how to realize justice or seek to secure a place in the new political system. 
Such negotiations of the terms of new beginnings in Africa, in which transitional 
justice measures are only one aspect of— and often challenged by — a multitude of 
much broader societal attempts at realizing more ‘justice’, constitute the subject 
matter of this collection. It is aimed at furthering our knowledge about transition 
and justice, including and transcending the usual transitional justice mechanisms, 
by presenting fine-grained case studies of sites where claims to justice are advanced 
and contested.  
The focus on Africa in this special issue is not accidental. Since the 
establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania, 
the African continent has turned into a veritable laboratory of transitional justice. 
The International Criminal Court (ICC), the first permanent international criminal 
tribunal in history, has focused almost exclusively on Africa. At the time of writing 
in June 2013, the prosecutor of the ICC had conducted investigations or trials 
against accused from seven African countries. This has attracted considerable 
criticism from various quarters, especially in Africa, where some see the ICC as a 
thinly veiled instrument of neo-colonialism. The advent of this critique is directly 
linked to the expansion of transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict situations 
in African countries characterized by fragile state institutions, widespread poverty 
and considerable internal fragmentation due to ethnicity and regionalism. In Sierra 
Leone, for instance, no less than four transitional justice mechanisms (amnesty, 
truth commission, international tribunal and domestic criminal trials) co-existed in 
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often uneasy relationships, as Gerhard Anders describes in his article. In Uganda, a 
similar pluralism of transitional justice institutions can be observed, as Adam 
Branch and Kimberley Armstrong show in their contributions. Uganda and Rwanda 
are of particular interest as these countries have experienced the most sustained 
efforts to create alternative transitional justice mechanisms more attuned to local 
culture and conceptions of justice.  
In contradistinction to Latin America, where transitional justice was one of 
the means to address human rights violations by authoritarian military regimes, 
transitional justice in Africa is mainly employed in efforts to end violent conflicts 
and civil wars in societies characterized by the absence of a strong state apparatus 
and a plurality of de facto sovereign political and military groups. The growing 
importance of transitional justice in international efforts to pacify volatile regions 
affected by civil war has resulted in a growing convergence of international 
peacebuilding, development and transitional justice mechanisms (de Greiff and 
Duthie, 2009; Mani, 2008; UN, 2004). The interventions of foreign actors such as 
the United Nations or donor countries promoting transitional justice institutions as 
part of much larger military-humanitarian interventions have resulted in complex 
relationships with state institutions and locally operating groups. This variety and 
complexity is not matched by other regions and allows the comparison of different 
debates about transition and justice both across Africa and within specific countries. 
Due to this complexity and variety, the African experiences can shed light on 
debates about transitional justice and new beginnings elsewhere. Put differently, 
given that ‘Africa’ is often treated as a prime location for putting transitional justice 
into practice, African case studies seem particularly suited to decentre such 
approaches and to refocus on broader attempts at bringing about transition and 
justice. 
 The articles in this special issue cover a wide range of situations, putting an 
emphasis on either explicit ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms in the context of 
broader negotiations of justice and transition or on the multifarious ways in which 
debates about new beginnings speak to lessons to be learnt for ‘transitional justice’. 
In this sense, the first set of articles aims at destabilizing the emphasis on 
transitional justice institutions in the analysis of new beginnings in Africa by 
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studying other sites where past injustices are addressed. The second set 
contextualizes transitional justice mechanisms, situating them in relation to 
conflicts and negotiations about the past and the future. Widening the scope and 
including other sites of contestation will benefit the social-scientific study of 
political change and attempts to come to terms with past injustices in Africa and 
elsewhere. By transcending the narrow focus on institutions this special issue seeks 
to address fundamental questions about transitions and justice in societies 
characterized by a high degree of external involvement and internal fragmentation.  
We contend that the new beginnings examined in this special issue are 
shaped by two inter-related dialectics. The first is the discrepancy between lofty 
promises of justice issued by lawyers, commissioners, diplomats and politicians and 
the messy realities on the ground and within the institutions themselves, where the 
official narrative is constantly invoked and challenged by people’s everyday actions. 
The second is the dialectic between the logics of exception, on the one hand, and 
the ordinary or normal, on the other hand. Re-education camps, repatriation of 
refugees, land restitution claims, truth commissions and war crimes trials are by no 
means ordinary measures; they are justified by an emergency or other exceptional 
circumstances. Yet there is no evidence for consensus on this, as the case studies in 
this collection show. In fact, there are groups and individuals who make a case for 
continuity by denying the extraordinary character of a situation and insisting on 
doing business as usual.  
These dialectics, and how they play out during political new beginnings, 
have not been addressed by the current debate on localizing transitional justice, as 
the literature review in part one of this Introduction shows. The second part of the 
Introduction discusses the problem of new beginnings, the paradox of legitimizing a 
new social-political order that seeks a break with the laws and mores of the past. 
The third part outlines the importance of the discrepancies between lofty promises 
of justice and messy realities in the context of new beginnings, and the fourth 
examines the importance of the dialectics between logics of the exceptional and the 
ordinary or normal for a more comprehensive understanding of justice that 
transcends transitional justice as a field of study. 
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APPROACHING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: STATE OF THE ART 
 
Transitional justice became an interdisciplinary field in its own right at the turn of 
the twenty-first century and has given rise to a burgeoning body of literature. 
Scholars from a range of disciplines including social and cultural anthropology, 
political science, theology and legal studies as well as practitioners and activists 
have focused on the analysis and development of institutions and processes 
including truth commissions, criminal prosecution, amnesty and reparations (Arthur, 
2009; Bell, 2009). According to a widely quoted definition by former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan transitional justice comprises: 
the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s 
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order 
to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may 
include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of 
international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, 
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a 
combination thereof. (UN, 2004: 4) 
 
During the 1980s and the 1990s, democratically elected governments 
replaced military regimes across Latin America. This resulted in heated debates 
about how to address the human rights violations committed under military rule. In 
Argentina, Chile and El Salvador, truth commissions were established to signify a 
new, democratic beginning. These institutions had the task to throw light on the fate 
of tens of thousands of suspected dissidents who had ‘disappeared’ under military 
rule and produce an authoritative historical record. Truth commission were 
advanced as an alternative to amnesty provisions, passed by the military rulers 
before relinquishing power, on the one hand, and criminal prosecutions, seen as 
threatening the stability of the new democracies, on the other. The first transitional 
justice studies were a direct response to these discussions about the merits and 
disadvantages of the various institutions set up to deal with the human rights 
violations of the military regimes in Latin America. During the 1990s, the first 
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systematic studies under the newly coined term ‘transitional justice’ were published, 
discussing possible solutions to the problem of how to come to terms with a violent 
past (Cohen, 1995; Kritz, 1995; Orentlicher, 1991). 
 In its formative years, transitional justice was mainly seen as a tool that 
could be employed to effect a transition to democracy and adequately deal with past 
injustices regardless of the specific socio-cultural context. The field was dominated 
by legal scholars and political scientists who adopted a model of legal and political 
reform to be employed during a transitional period from autocratic rule to 
democracy. This reflected a broader shift during the 1980s and 1990s, away from 
the emphasis placed by modernization theory and Marxism on socio-economic 
structures (Arthur, 2009: 337–8). Instead, the quickly expanding transnational 
human rights movement advanced individual rights and political liberalism as the 
main drivers of progress. Authors like Bass (2000), Minow (1998) and Teitel (2000, 
2003) legitimized the new concept of transitional justice by tracing it to the 
Nuremberg Trials and other trials against perpetrators of war crimes and the 
holocaust after World War II, although the term itself was not coined until the 
1990s, as Arthur (2009) points out.  
 This shift is particularly striking with regard to Africa where, during the 
1960s and 1970s, socio-economic structural transformation was seen as key in 
overcoming the legacy of colonialism. After the wave of democratization of the 
1990s, when many countries across Africa introduced multi-party democracy, 
political liberalism and the belief in the potential of the free market became the 
principal paradigms in sub-Saharan Africa. The international financial institutions 
and the Western donor community welcomed the vision of individual rights and 
agency underlying both liberalism and capitalism, and vigorously promoted 
democracy, human rights and good governance. Transitional justice, also informed 
by a liberal belief in the transformative power of individual rights, became a key 
part of international humanitarian and development interventions and of national 
projects with the goal of realizing democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  
 On how to achieve these objectives, opinions have been divided. At one end 
of the spectrum are those who deem compromises necessary to maintain peace. At 
the other end are those who maintain that the punishment of perpetrators is the only 
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credible means of achieving justice. This debate, known as peace versus justice, has 
shaped transitional justice for a long time. In this context, truth commissions were 
advanced as compromise between amnesty and criminal prosecutions, creating a 
form of accountability but refraining from the punishment of perpetrators (Rotberg 
and Thompson, 2000; van Zyl, 1999). Recent studies have attempted to transcend 
the stark opposition between peace and justice by advocating a mix of several 
institutions including truth commissions and various forms of community justice, as 
well as criminal trials at national and international courts (Roht-Arriaza and 
Mariezcurrena, 2006; Sriram and Pillay, 2009).   
The question of whether truth commissions or criminal trials are better 
suited to deal with past injustices has been partly eclipsed by the recent debate 
about localizing transitional justice. The idea that transitional justice institutions 
need to be adapted to socio-cultural specificities reflects growing doubts about the 
universalism of transitional justice, the ability to aid the establishment of liberal 
democracy in any socio-cultural setting. This universalistic outlook is mainly due to 
the influence of political science and law, the principal academic disciplines 
defining the field (Arthur, 2009; Bell, 2009). 
The universality of the institutions and the objectives of transitional justice 
have come under critical scrutiny by a growing body of scholarship. Especially 
anthropologists, with their keen eye for the specificities of place and cultural 
difference, have been at the forefront of this critique. Wilson’s (2001) anthropology 
of the South African TRC is one of the first examples of this approach. His book 
questions two basic assumptions informing the establishment of the TRC in South 
Africa. The first concerns the vision of a truly multicultural, non-nationalist 
constitutionalism after the end of apartheid based on universal human rights; a new 
culture not refracted by ethnicity, communalism or nationalism. The second was the 
idea of the existence of a unified concept of African restorative justice aimed at 
national reconciliation shared by all South Africans. By contrast, Wilson’s 
ethnographic evidence shows how ‘human rights talk is enmeshed in culturalist 
discourses on community and becomes an integral part of nation-building’ (Wilson, 
2001: 17). According to him, the ultimate objectives of the TRC process were the 
strengthening of the state’s bureaucracy and legal system (ibid.) rather than 
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realizing restorative justice and national reconciliation. He further shows that 
perceptions of restorative justice and reconciliation as cornerstones of the new 
constitutionalist national identity were by no means shared by all South Africans, 
some of whom favoured retributive justice (ibid.: 14–16). 
This focus on the people in whose name justice is said to be done and the 
places where official narratives are challenged both in word and action gained in 
importance as more research on transitional justice in action was conducted in a 
number of different countries and institutions. It also became clear that the concept 
of transitional justice was by no means universal. A number of social-scientific 
studies have argued that ideas about achieving justice through truth-telling and 
punishment are rooted in Occidental religious and legal traditions. Research on 
Rwanda (Barnet, 2008; Buckley-Zistel, 2006; Eltringham, 2004; Thomson, 2011), 
Uganda (Allen, 2006; Finnstrom, 2008), South Africa (Ross, 2003) and Sierra 
Leone (Shaw, 2005, 2007) revealed a wide variety of voices and experiences in the 
regions affected by large-scale violence. For instance, Buckley-Zistel (2006) and 
Shaw (2005, 2007) argue that people in these regions did not share Western 
conceptions of truth-telling and reconciliation but preferred silence or social 
forgetting as a way to come to terms with the violent past. 
Other studies highlight the diversity of views held by people in the regions 
affected by violence. Allen’s research on Northern Uganda (2006) traces the 
divisions between those preferring amnesty, those who support neo-traditional 
reconciliation ceremonies and those who demand retributive justice from the ICC. 
Finnstrom’s (2008) ethnography of the everyday survival of the Acholi people in 
Northern Uganda suggests an even more complex picture defying simplistic 
accounts of clear divisions between victims and perpetrators as people struggle to 
come to terms with ‘bad surroundings’.  
With regard to international criminal justice, several authors adopt a cultural 
relativist stance similar to Shaw’s perspective. For instance, Clarke (2009) and 
Kelsall (2009) focus on the cultural differences between international criminal 
justice and African conceptions of justice, truth and fact-finding. Clarke argues that 
local conceptions of justice and law tend to be at odds with the language of human 
rights and international criminal law. In his study of the Special Court for Sierra 
[10]  
Leone, Kelsall blames the problems encountered by the court on cultural 
differences between Western law and African culture. According to Kelsall, the 
Special Court failed to appreciate ‘different ideas of social space and time, of 
causation, agency, responsibility, evidence, truth and truth-telling’ (Kelsall, 2009: 
17) prevalent in Sierra Leone. 
Other studies situate the international criminal tribunals in relation to the 
international influences and the national political landscape, and trace how the 
tribunals produce historical narratives. Anders (2009) situates the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone in relation to the debate about international criminal justice and the 
national political arena in Sierra Leone. Hagan et al. (2006) show how US politics 
affected the prosecutorial strategy at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Wilson’s (2011) study analyses how various features 
and dynamics of international criminal justice have shaped the historical accounts 
produced by the international tribunals. By tracing the various influences, these 
studies have contributed to a better, empirically more grounded understanding of 
the development of international criminal justice. 
This revisionist scholarship has started to make some impact in the wider 
field of transitional justice. This is mainly due to the growing body of empirical 
knowledge about the manifold problems encountered when transitional justice 
mechanisms have been adapted to different situations and places. Even proponents 
of transitional justice admit that place matters, as abstract ideals such as 
reconciliation or justice are constantly contested and questioned by people who seek 
to engage or try to avoid the mechanisms of transitional justice at work (Orentlicher, 
2007). In response to these problems, attempts have been made to localize 
transitional justice by advancing alternative mechanisms. Africa has been 
spearheading this trend with the gacaca courts in Rwanda and supposedly 
traditional reconciliation ceremonies in Northern Uganda. These institutions are 
presented as drawing on African cultural values and concepts of justice by 
emphasizing community involvement and reconciliation between perpetrators and 
victims. Several authors such as Kelsall (2009) support the establishment of these 
alternative transitional justice mechanisms due to their hybrid and localized 
character. 
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Generally, the donor community has hailed these neo-traditional institutions 
as being more responsive to African values and expectations but a growing number 
of scholars have advanced a scathing critique. They argue that in fact they do not 
constitute manifestations of authentic African culture. In Rwanda, international 
humanitarian activists (Oomen, 2005) and the government (Waldorf, 2010) have 
promoted the gacaca courts as a cheap and quick way of dealing with the large 
number of génocidaires. Clark’s (2010) study also draws an ambivalent and 
complex picture of community involvement in the gacaca courts, which does not 
correspond with simplistic ideas about African culture. With regard to Uganda, 
Branch (2011) criticizes the essentializing culturalism driving supposedly African 
transitional justice mechanisms, a critique he further develops in his contribution to 
this special issue. The edited volume Localizing Transitional Justice (Shaw et al., 
2010) exemplifies the critique of the aloofness of transitional justice and the 
problems surrounding the introduction of supposedly African alternative institutions 
such as the gacaca. In the book’s introduction, Shaw and Waldorf suggest adopting 
a ‘place-based’ approach to explore the multifaceted encounters between universal 
transitional justice discourse and ‘local practices and priorities’ (ibid.: 5). Their 
empirical evidence on local practices shows how clearly differentiated categories of 
victim and perpetrator fail to account for complex realities on the ground where 
people often prefer silence to public displays of truth-telling.  
By now, the emphasis on sound empirical knowledge of the local and 
increasing scepticism towards the efficacy of transitional justice mechanisms are 
shared by a growing group of scholars in the field of transitional justice (Bell, 2009; 
Orentlicher, 2007; Teitel, 2003; Theidon, 2009). We agree with Shaw and others 
that local, place-based empirical evidence is important. Clearly, the emphasis on 
empirical evidence is sensible from a methodological perspective. However, it runs 
the risk of reproducing the scalar logic of global, national and local that tends to 
obscure the multifarious ways in which these scales are being made and re-made in 
processes of negotiation and contestation. Transcending the mainly methodological 
concern with scalarity we deem three issues to be crucial to the understanding of 
transitional justice in the context of much wider social debates on justice and 
political change: the problem of ‘new beginnings’ — the paradox of legitimizing a 
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novelty, of finding a foundation for that which explicitly breaks with the past; the 
discrepancies between lofty promises and the messy realities of transitional justice 
in action; and the dialectic between logics of the exception and the ordinary 
employed to legitimize or resist transitional justice mechanisms. 
 
 
THE PROBLEM OF NEW BEGINNINGS 
 
New beginnings have often been associated with violence. According to Arendt: 
The relevance of the problem of beginning to the phenomenon of revolution 
is obvious. That such a beginning must be intimately connected with 
violence seems to be vouched for by the legendary beginnings of our history 
as both biblical and classical antiquity report it: Cain slew Abel, and 
Romulus slew Remus; violence was the beginning and, by the same token, 
no beginning could be made without using violence, without violating. 
(Arendt,1990/1963:20) 
In Arendt’s seminal analysis, the problem of beginning is key to the understanding 
of modern revolutions and the violence with which revolutionary change tends to be 
brought about. According to Arendt, the modern idea of revolution differs from pre-
modern ideas of political change as it envisages the beginning of a new era, a 
complete break with the past to realize freedom, social equality and justice. 
 When Arendt was writing On Revolution in the early 1960s, many African 
countries were achieving independence. Prominent African leaders such as Kwame 
Nkrumah, Sekou Touré and Julius Nyerere framed the strife for national 
independence in the language of revolution, socialism and Pan-Africanism and did 
not eschew the use of violence to achieve independence. Theorists such as Fanon 
(2004/1961) explicitly condoned violence to end colonialism and emancipate the 
colonized populations from deeply entrenched racism and economic exploitation. 
During the 1990s, this appeared to change, and since the turn of the twenty-first 
century, violence is no longer seen as a legitimate means to bring about social 
change. Representative democracy has spread throughout the continent, but many 
parts of Africa have also experienced widespread violence and civil war in bitter 
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conflicts over the control of state institutions and natural resources, with Sierra 
Leone, Rwanda, Uganda, Liberia and Somalia becoming the most prominent 
examples of state failure and armed conflict.  
It was these conflicts that triggered the establishment of international 
tribunals, truth commissions and other transitional justice mechanisms, which are 
now seen as key in strengthening representative democracy and the rule of law. 
Following the Latin American template, South Africa was the first country in sub-
Saharan Africa to establish a transitional justice mechanism in the form of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission during its transition from the apartheid regime. 
This was followed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established 
to hold accountable the main perpetrators of the genocide in 1994. In 2002, another 
ad hoc criminal tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, was set up in Freetown 
to hold accountable perpetrators of war crimes committed during the civil war. In 
the same year, the ICC, the first permanent international criminal tribunal, was 
established in The Hague. The ICC has mainly focused on African situations 
including the case against the leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern 
Uganda, and its first concluded trial against Thomas Lubanga, who was found 
guilty in March 2012 of conscripting and enlisting children in the DRC. 
 All of these situations face the problem of new beginnings. In 
contradistinction to Arendt’s analysis of revolutionary new beginnings and the 
revolutionary spirit of decolonization during the 1960s, current debates about new 
beginnings in Africa often revolve around transitional justice and explicitly reject 
revolutionary violence. Transitional justice also seeks a break with the past but by 
addressing past injustices rather than by violent means. The two principal 
techniques employed are the production of an authoritative historical record 
contributing to national reconciliation, and criminal trials to hold accountable the 
perpetrators of war crimes and human rights violations.  
 As mentioned earlier, liberal constitutionalism, rule of law and human rights 
are the ultimate objectives of fact-finding by truth commissions and criminal 
tribunals. For instance, the preamble of the South African Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 establishing the truth commission invokes ‘a 
future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-
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existence for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex’. 
Similarly, representatives of international criminal courts have highlighted the 
importance of criminal trials beyond the mere punishment of individuals who have 
committed crimes. In 2000, for instance, the UN Secretary General stated in his 
report to the UN Security Council that the Special Court for Sierra Leone ‘would 
contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace in that country’ (UN, 2000: 13). 
Truth commissions and courts are manifestations of a reformist and 
legalistic approach to effecting new beginnings; they have their foundation in legal 
documents including national legislation, international law or peace agreements 
between warring factions. The South African truth commission is based on the 
South African interim constitution of 1993 and the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act (1995); the Special Court for Sierra Leone on an agreement 
between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone authorized by the UN 
Security Council; the ICTR on several Security Council Resolutions; and the ICC 
on an international treaty.  
These founding documents differ from the American Declaration of 
Independence of 1776 or the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen of 1789 as they do not represent a complete break with the past. Whereas 
the French Declaration of 1789 rejected the sovereignty of the monarch and 
introduced popular sovereignty, the African South constitution was the outcome of 
a long process of negotiation between the apartheid regime and the African 
National Congress (ANC) resulting in the gradual transfer of power and a 
compromise between the old regime and the new political order. According to 
Lollini, the ‘language of constitutional law became the syntax and shared language’ 
(Lollini, 2011: 28) of the National Party (NP) and the ANC. 
 Generally, the condemnation of violence is one of the hallmarks of 
transitional justice with its focus on legal reform and peaceful dialogue. In spite of 
the promise of peace and inclusion even the new social and political order 
envisaged by transitional justice might rely on founding violence, as Branch shows 
in his article on Northern Uganda (this issue). His account reveals the contradiction 
between the rhetoric of reconciliation and justice espoused by the advocates of 
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transitional justice mechanisms such as mato oput and continued violence and 
injustices in the supposedly pacified districts of Northern Uganda. The discrepancy 
between the liberal narrative informing truth commissions, courts and localized, 
neo-traditional initiatives, on the one hand, and the messy contradictory realities in 
the regions affected by violence and injustice, on the other hand, are one of the key 
themes addressed by this special issue. 
 
 
LOFTY PROMISES AND MESSY REALITIES 
 
Tensions and contradictions between the often lofty and abstract ideals of 
(transitional) justice and their actual enactments and realizations in practice have a 
profound impact on the ways in which new beginnings in Africa evolve. The 
ethnographic case studies in this volume on Sierra Leone, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Mauritania and South Africa explore the relationship between abstract ideas and 
ideals of justice, on the one hand, and often bitter political power struggles and 
mundane bureaucratic practices, on the other hand. Justice is always refracted in 
individuals’ everyday experiences, challenged or instantiated in specific situations, 
as Riano-Alcalà and Baines (2012) argue in a recent publication on transitional 
justice and the everyday. It is striking how absolute ideas about justice are 
constantly invoked by international organizations, social activists and politicians as 
well as ordinary people who are engaged in complex negotiations, while ostensibly 
upholding justice as a non-negotiable principle. For instance, in Steffen Jensen’s 
discussion on South African police reform in this volume, justice as such does 
indeed seem non-negotiable; however, quite different and conflicting versions of 
justice emerge in practice, depending on whether freedom is sought from a 
repressive state apparatus, i.e. the police itself, or from crime. Similarly, the justice 
of actual outcomes in South African land restitution, in the course of which the state 
compensates victims of former race-based dispossessions, is evaluated quite 
differently on the basis of divergent property regimes that are hardly ever made 
explicit (see Olaf Zenker, this volume). What is more, it might take a conscious 
effort to raise public awareness in the first place for the fact that normalized poverty 
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actually constitutes an unacceptable state of injustice, as the recent ‘toilet wars’ in 
South Africa show (Steven Robins, this volume) — whether such goals are pursued 
through spectacular or rather ordinary activism. 
The international criminal tribunals have promoted an ambitious vision of 
justice and peace based on retributive justice, the punishment of political and 
military leaders who are held responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide. Anders’ analysis focuses on the discrepancy between the lofty 
promises of justice made by the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the violent 
conflicts between the political leaders and former commanders of the warring 
factions who sought to secure a place in the political order after the end of the civil 
war. Similarly, Nigel Eltringham’s ethnography of the experiences of lawyers and 
judges at the ICTR raises fundamental doubts about the promise of new beginnings 
heralded by the tribunal. The contributions by Kimberley Armstrong, Adam Branch 
and Sabine Höhn on the interventions by the ICC in Uganda and Kenya also 
highlight the conflicts and contestations about new beginnings and justice in the 
affected regions where the international project of global justice is often challenged 
by individuals and groups.  
 
 
BETWEEN EXCEPTIONS AND BUSINESS AS USUAL 
 
Transitional justice institutions are exceptional instruments established to address 
extraordinary situations. None of these institutions is meant to be permanent. Even 
investigations of the ICC, a permanent international organization, are conceived as 
temporary interventions in the internal affairs of a country in response to 
extraordinary circumstances sanctioned by international law. And yet special 
tribunals or truth commissions follow a well-established set of templates with 
criminal trials at one end of the continuum and blanket amnesty at the other end. 
Arendt’s (1963) account of Eichmann’s trial reminds us that ordinary measures 
such as criminal trials often seem barely adequate to deal with the most 
extraordinary crime of genocide (see also Drumbl,2007: 1–10). 
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In her history of transitional justice, Teitel (2003: 71–2) points out that in 
‘this contemporary phase, transitional jurisprudence normalizes an expanded 
discourse of humanitarian justice’. In her view, ‘there is no clear boundary between 
ordinary and transitional periods’ (ibid.: 93). We would like to interrogate this 
boundary between the extraordinary and the ordinary, which we think is key to 
understanding new beginnings in Africa and elsewhere. The contributions to this 
special issue question the clear boundary between the transition phase and 
normality. For instance, the articles on South Africa illustrate that, more than a 
decade after the TRC published its report, the transition phase is not over. At the 
ANC National Policy Conference in June 2012, President Zuma called for a ‘second 
transition’ to highlight the ongoing need to come to terms with apartheid’s legacy. 
As a consequence, debates about justice, compensation and recognition have 
expanded in various arenas, as Jensen, Zenker and Robins show in their case studies.  
Logics of the exception are invoked and employed by a wide range of actors. 
This includes the classical ‘state of exception’, as declared in a foundational act of 
state sovereignty (Agamben, 2005; Benjamin, 1996; Schmitt, 1985). In a 
reconfiguration of such sovereign power, a similar logic of exception is also utilized 
within foreign interventions and by various transitional justice institutions, drawing 
on a pan-human ethic of compassion, international humanitarian law and 
universalized human rights standards in order to justify local engagements (Fassin 
and Pandolfi, 2010). But logics of exception are by no means the prerogative of 
modern states, international organizations or humanitarian activists alone, as a 
multitude of voices advances similar or divergent claims to sovereignty (Hansen 
and Stepputat, 2005). Negotiations of new beginnings in Africa are thus shaped by 
competing logics — logics that vary not only between different actors, but also 
possibly within a unitary agent such as ‘the state’.  
The multitude of voices and claims to exceptionality is mirrored by logics of 
the ordinary instantiated by states, international agencies and Africans from all 
walks of life. For instance, international organizations and transitional justice 
mechanisms often emphasize a normal sequence from chaos to order based on a 
tried and tested model or tool to aid transition and reconciliation. However, it is 
important to note that these claims — even though backed up by an overwhelming 
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military-humanitarian apparatus — do not go unchallenged. Often the envisioned 
beneficiaries of these good intentions refuse to adopt the proclaimed reading of 
exceptionality. Instead, they invoke an alternative logic of the ordinary in seeing a 
neo-colonial agenda or other perfectly mundane political and economic interests at 
work behind the rhetoric of exception. We hence propose to pay particular attention 
to the dialectics of various logics of the exception, which justify extraordinary 
measures in exceptional times, as well as different logics of the ordinary that 
envision the transition towards a just(er) future as a difficult, yet perfectly mundane 
affair. We argue that these entanglements of logics of the exception and the 
ordinary have a crucial bearing on the peculiar trajectories that the discursive and 
practical negotiations of ‘justice’ can take in particular settings. This is so because a 
certain incident or ‘move’ within such negotiations acquires variable connectivity, 
depending on the concrete logics of the exception and/or the ordinary, in which it 
becomes embedded. A focus on these two analytical dimensions in their 
interrelation is thus crucial for a deeper understanding of transitions to justice in 
specific African settings. 
 
 
THE ARTICLES 
 
Simon Turner’s article on the repatriation from camp life to post-genocide Rwanda 
succinctly illustrates the dialectics between the two logics. Here subtle similarities 
and differences are at work between Hutu refugee camps under the UNHCR and 
Hutu re-education camps called ingando that are run by the Tutsi-dominated new 
Rwandan state as a specific transitional justice measure. While the refugee camps 
conform closely to the logic of exception, in which Hutu refugees (i.e. potential 
génocidaires) are reduced to the bare life of an a-historical humanity, the ingando 
camps make use of a profoundly historical logic of exceptionality, conceiving ex-
combatants as ‘bad life’ in need of purification. Both camps aim for reintegration 
and new beginnings; yet whereas the UN invokes a logic of the ordinary that wants 
to turn Hutu refugees into universal citizens with no specified history, the Tutsi-
dominated state seeks the production of ‘good citizens’ in terms of an ethnically 
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cleansed Rwandan history. Given that ingando is only compulsory for Hutu ex-
combatants, while Tutsis join separate solidarity camps (itorero) that merely 
enhance their elite careers, quite different ideals and practices of ‘justice’ emerge 
from these three spaces of exception and from the divergent transitional trajectories 
inscribed in them. 
Marion Fresia’s study of the official repatriation of Mauritanian refugees as 
both an act of transitional justice and as a prerequisite for further transitional justice 
measures equally focuses on the camp as an exceptional site where the terms of new 
beginnings are intensely debated. Her ethnography of refugee camps in Senegal 
shows how a dominant politico-humanitarian narrative about past human rights 
violations was co-constructed by both the refugee elite and human rights 
organizations, portraying the refugees based on humanitarian law as being in a state 
of exception in relation to the ordinary logic of the international law of sovereign 
states. However, these refugees were by no means a homogenous group. They 
comprised different subsets with divergent interests and Fresia further shows how 
the dominant narrative was also contested by counter-narratives, putting forward 
quite different understandings of new beginnings and desirable transitions to other 
forms of justice. Moreover, her analysis reveals substantial discrepancies between 
locals’ discourses and their practices: on the one hand, many highlight the 
importance of the order of nation states underlying their predicament as ‘refugees’, 
while, on the other hand, deviantly disregarding precisely this order and thus the 
‘refugee’/’citizen’ dichotomy in their everyday practices. 
Police violence in post-apartheid South Africa also seems to be under the 
spell of two alternating logics of exceptionality, each one forming the background 
of the other. The first of these, as Jensen points out, refers to the need, immediately 
recognized and addressed with the end of apartheid, to profoundly transform the old 
apartheid police within the transitional justice measure of a security sector reform, 
in order to prevent further human rights violations (such as torture). However, in the 
mid-1990s, a second emergency moved to centre stage, namely the threat to 
national liberation posed by high levels of crime, apparently necessitating hefty 
police violence as a means to protect the citizens. While on the level of abstract 
ideals, these two exceptional logics seem complementary, Jensen shows how on the 
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level of messy everyday practices they actually clash: they end up giving preference 
to different notions of ‘justice’ — freedom from police violence versus freedom 
from crime — with each logic of exceptionality dismissing the concern of the other 
as ‘ordinary’. In this sense, the first logic conceives police violence as requiring 
exceptional measures (and frames crime as ordinary), whereas the second logic sees 
excessive crime as justifying exceptional police violence (and treats security sector 
reform as ordinary). The transitional justice of institutional reform is thus left in a 
state of ambiguity, since — depending on which exceptional logic is activated — 
excessive police violence constitutes either an obstacle or a means to create a new 
beginning for South Africa. 
Robins’ discussion of the recent ‘toilet wars’ in South Africa provides 
another example of the relevance of different logics of the exception and the 
ordinary. In the run-up to the 2011 local government elections, the existence of 
open (i.e. unenclosed) porcelain toilets in Western Cape townships run by the 
Democratic Alliance provincial government was suddenly elevated to a public 
scandal by activists from the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL). 
This was achieved by what Robins calls a ‘politics of the spectacle’, which — 
drawing on a logic of exceptionality — represented the ‘anti-dignity toilets’ as a 
high-profile incident of gross injustice. The spectacle involving the mass media, 
High Courts and the South African Human Rights Commission soon deteriorated 
into opportunistic politicking. By contrast, social movements such as the Social 
Justice Coalition (SJC) have engaged the sanitation problem for a much longer time 
through a ‘politics of the ordinary’. Rather than using spectacular acts of resistance, 
such social movements have patiently deployed personal testimonies, protests, 
petitions, scientific reports, statistics and litigation to render politically legible 
everyday forms of structural injustice, thereby projecting a quite different avenue 
towards a more just society. Robins argues that the logic of exceptionality, 
underpinning both the short-lived politics of the spectacle and the narrowly 
conceived transitional justice mechanism of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, is ultimately ill-equipped to deal with the structural inequalities still 
haunting post-apartheid South Africa; by contrast, in fighting structural violence, 
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the ordinary logic of slow activism stands a better chance of contributing towards a 
much broader ‘transitional social justice’. 
The justice of South African land restitution is also evaluated differently, 
and hence contested, depending on whether restitution is read in terms of a logic of 
the exception or of the ordinary. As a transitional justice measure of the state, aimed 
at restoring justice in the light of the exceptional condition of massive, racially 
motivated land dispossessions in the past, post-apartheid restitution law 
retrospectively transforms the conception of landed property on which past 
dispossessions had built. However, as Zenker shows, many former (white) 
landowners expect restitution to still operate as an ordinary process within an 
unchanged property system, whereas, in fact, it is driven by an exceptional process 
of a new transformative property regime. Rather than making restitution’s instituted 
logic of exceptionality their own, such former owners end up reading the events in 
terms of an ordinary logic of ‘victor’s justice’, in which the allegedly politically 
motivated transfer of land to Africans is interpreted as being merely dressed up as 
‘restitution’. In this way, the proclaimed ideal of bringing about justice and 
reconciliation through the restitution process is seen as being undermined, in 
practice, through an unjust and politically motivated implementation process. 
Zenker argues that if all parties in a claim had to interact face-to-face with each 
other and share their histories of (dis)possessions, there would be a better chance 
for the development of more ‘common-sense’. Given the current institutional 
format, however, deeply entrenched differences regarding the justice of restituted 
lands remain. Under such conditions, agreements on the terms of a new beginning 
seem difficult to reach. 
International criminal tribunals are based on the idea that exceptional 
circumstances justify interventions in countries where the national authorities are 
unable or unwilling to hold accountable the perpetrators of crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. This is what happened in Sierra Leone where the government 
requested the United Nations to set up a special tribunal to hold accountable those 
‘bearing the greatest responsibility’ for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed during the civil war. This UN-backed tribunal was supposed to deliver 
justice and contribute to a peaceful new beginning of Sierra Leone but as Anders’ 
[22]  
analysis shows, this promise was never realized. Instead, the volatile transition 
period at the turn of the twenty-first century was characterized by a violent struggle 
over positions of power and influence that suggest the continuity of patterns of 
Sierra Leonean politics rather than a new beginning. Sierra Leone provides an 
illuminating case, as an international criminal tribunal operated in parallel to a truth 
commission. Moreover, the government had already declared a state of emergency 
in 1998 and used these powers to arrest and detain hundreds of former combatants 
in an attempt to remove the former rebels from the political arena. 
Eltringham makes a similar point in his ethnography of lawyers and judges 
at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The ICTR was meant to mark a 
new beginning both for Rwanda and internationally, by contributing to a global 
legal order. Over time, emphasis shifted from its contribution to Rwandan 
reconciliation to the idea of a new beginning for international criminal justice. At 
the court, however, lawyers and judges held different opinions regarding the 
tribunal’s national and international impact. These differences and contradictions 
are particularly stark with regard to discussions at the tribunal about the failure to 
indict members of the Rwandan Patriotic Army for alleged war crimes in 1994 and 
accusations of ‘victor’s justice’. 
The three articles dealing with the interventions of the ICC in Kenya and 
Uganda highlight the growing importance of this permanent international criminal 
tribunal for debates about the terms of new beginnings in Africa. Höhn’s analysis of 
the impact the ICC investigations have had on the political arena in Kenya illustrate 
the growing salience of the ICC. The violence surrounding the 2007 elections were 
widely perceived as exceptional. Due to the failure of the Kenyan authorities to 
hold accountable those responsible for organizing the violence, the ICC stepped in 
as an extraordinary response to an exceptional situation. The ICC’s intervention 
signalled the expansion of the scope of the tribunal’s activities, which had been 
limited to civil wars, into a new domain. This development highlights the role the 
ICC is likely to play in expanding and consolidating a specific model of multi-party 
democracy promoted by the UN and other actors. According to Höhn, it is less clear 
whether the ICC’s intervention represents a new beginning for Kenya. It seems 
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unlikely that the political elite will embark on the social and political reforms that 
would be needed to address the root causes of electoral violence.  
Armstrong and Branch both address the debates about transitional justice 
and the intervention of the ICC in Northern Uganda. In many ways this case 
symbolizes the contradictions and tensions underlying the project of advancing 
global justice. The arrest warrants against five leaders of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army issued in 2005 were the first to be issued by the ICC. Since then the 
investigation has entered a limbo as the Ugandan government, which originally had 
referred the case to the ICC, has removed its support for the ICC, considering 
various domestic options. As elsewhere, the debate in Uganda has been framed in 
terms of justice and peace, with justice serving as shorthand for a retributive justice 
mechanism and peace denoting amnesty and other non-retributive forms of 
restorative justice. Armstrong unpacks this debate and shows how supporters and 
opponents of the ICC have sought to relate to and adapt ideas about justice and 
peace in the negotiations about a new beginning in Northern Uganda. 
 Branch examines a localized model of transitional justice in Northern 
Uganda that has been promoted as an alternative to the retributive vision of 
transitional justice promoted by the ICC. This form of supposedly traditional justice, 
or what Branch refers to as ‘ethnojustice’, is said to represent African or more 
specifically Acholi concepts of justice and to be much better adapted to the local 
socio-cultural context in Northern Uganda than Western criminal justice. Branch’s 
analysis reveals to what extent ethnojustice is shaped by essentialist ideas about 
African cultural authenticity that strengthen the claims to political authority 
advanced by traditional leaders who lost much legitimacy during the violent conflict. 
His evidence challenges the dominant official narrative of a new beginning in 
Northern Uganda. Branch argues that transitional justice in Northern Uganda did 
not bring liberal peace but instead has legitimized new and old forms of everyday 
violence and injustice. 
The proposed perspective on ‘justice’ between the exceptional and the 
ordinary thus enables the contributing authors to explore issues and themes 
commonly deemed to fall outside the scope of analysis of transitional justice. They 
situate courts and other transitional justice mechanisms within wider debates about 
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justice, human rights discourses and humanitarian interventions. They combine 
analyses of the interventions of international criminal tribunals in Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone with studies of restitution and human rights in South 
Africa and debates about justice among refugees in Mauritania and Rwanda. These 
debates about the terms of new beginnings are key to the study of contemporary 
Africa and its place in a wider world. The various case studies show the 
considerable differences between divergent situations, fleshing out the wide 
spectrum of debates about justice and transition across Africa. All situations share, 
however, the prominent role played by foreign influences either in the form of 
institutions such as courts or globally circulating ideas about justice. In addition, 
foreign interventions have generally had profound economic, social and political 
consequences influencing African debates about a just order, whilst being shaped in 
often unforeseen ways by the local settings they are operating in. The case studies 
address these dynamics of localizing justice within settings shaped by 
transnationally circulating ideas, state-driven processes and variable place-based 
aspirations. In focusing on the discursive and practical negotiations of justice, 
situated within entanglements of logics of the exception and the ordinary, they thus 
ultimately aim for a better understanding of current debates about transition, justice 
and ‘transitional justice’ in Africa. 
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